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Summary 
 
As part of the broader research programme on how ‘new actors in 
international development’ might influence European development 
cooperation in the coming decade, this paper provides an overview of the 
engagement of three types of non-state development actors: private 
foundations, corporate philanthropies, and global vertical programmes. In 
discussing financial commitments, funding priorities, and implementation 
approaches of these actors, the paper identifies key issues for European 
donors to consider in developing a response to their growing presence in the 
development landscape.  
 
One basic challenge in crafting policy responses to the rise of new non-state 
actors is the dearth of information that is available related to levels of 
financing, the geographical and sectoral distribution of resources, and the 
impact of interventions.  This challenge is particularly evident in looking at the 
global giving efforts of corporations, and deficits concerning the role of 
European firms in the development cooperation landscape are especially 
large. This inadequate knowledge base is partly a reflection of the diffuse 
nature of private actors that are engaging in global development. However, 
the EU and its member states can help to remedy this problem by 
strengthening financial reporting requirements, investing in data collection 
and monitoring efforts, and working more closely with industry associations 
that help to set standards for philanthropic practice.  
 
A second key challenge for European donors is to develop mechanisms for 
transferring their accumulated knowledge to emerging non-state actors. 
Through decades of experience in development, donor agencies have learned 
important lessons on how to work in diverse operational contexts, develop 
approaches that cut across sectors, and better involve local stakeholders in 
planning and implementation, and have identified ways of enhancing the 
effectiveness of their own aid efforts.  The new global philanthropists may be 
disadvantaged in entering the development field due to a knowledge base 
that is limited in geographical scope and specific to particular sectors. 
Improved knowledge transfer can contribute to increasing the willingness of 
new actors to invest resources in unfamiliar operating environments and to 
increase their chances of success and their willingness to sustain existing 
commitments in the long term.  
 
Global vertical programmes, like private philanthropic efforts, provide a 
vehicle for mobilizing additional resources to promote specific development 
goals.  Unlike private philanthropic initiatives, however, these programmes 
represent an extension of existing aid systems.  As major stakeholders in 
global programmes, European donors have an obligation and the capacity to 
improve the consistency between global and country-level programming and 
to avoid the emergence of parallel and uncoordinated systems of aid 
implementation.  Criticisms of limited coordination between more traditional 
donors and global vertical programmes partly reflect incomplete progress in 
coordination within the traditional aid system, which European donors can 
work to redress.   
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Emerging Non-State Actors in Global Development: Challenges for 
Europe 
 
By Erik Lundsgaarde 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
One of the main features of the evolving global development landscape is a 
diversification in the nature of the main actors on the playing field.  This 
diversification relates both to changes within the developing world that have 
placed rising economic and political powers in a class apart from states still 
struggling to confront basic development challenges and to an expansion of the 
circle of actors playing a prominent role in investing in development cooperation.  
These two dimensions of the diversification phenomenon have been evident in a 
growing body of research on the role of emerging powers in world politics and in 
development cooperation.1
 
  The contribution of the two largest developing 
countries to the changing face of the world has attracted special attention in this 
regard, with the rise of China attracting the most attention of all.  
This focus on China, India, and other emerging powers is well-justified, given 
that their international influence is multifaceted, carrying implications for the 
structure of the global economy as well as for the practice of global governance 
across a variety of issue areas (ie climate change, trade, international security).  
Even though the scale of their public investments in developing countries lags 
behind those of leading OECD countries, this financial engagement has risen 
steadily in recent years and will likely continue to increase in the future.2
 
  Apart 
from their development assistance contributions, they are important to other 
developing countries as trading partners and as political actors with an ability to 
influence the global rules that will structure the opportunities available to less 
powerful states.   
Alongside these ‘new’ state actors, a variety of non-state actors are also 
increasingly visible players in the development landscape by virtue of the scale of 
their financial commitments targeted toward achieving global development goals.  
In 2008, grants from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in its Global Health 
and Global Development programmes alone approached US$2.3 billion, a figure 
rivalling Belgium’s development assistance budget for that year and surpassing 
the aid outlays of smaller European donors such as Austria, Finland, or Portugal.3
                                                 
1 Examples of work on the role of emerging powers in world politics include Kaplinsky / Messner 
(2008), Cooper / Antkiewicz (2008) and Ajakaiye / Kaplinsky (2009).  On the role of non-DAC 
actors in development cooperation see, for example, Manning (2006), Kragelund (2008), and 
Rowlands (2008).  
 
2 Estimates of the level of engagement of the emerging powers as providers of development 
assistance vary, reflecting problems with data collection.  Researchers studying Chinese aid 
volumes suggest that annual giving lies somewhere in a broad range between US$1 billion and 
US$25 billion (Lum et al. 2009).  Aid distributed by other emerging powers is less significant.  
Estimates of Indian aid lie between US$500 million and US$1 billion; the volume of Brazil’s aid has 
recently been estimated at around US$360 million; for South Africa the estimate is just under 
US$200 million (ECOSOC 2008).  
3 The source of the Gates Foundation figure is the foundation’s 2008 Annual Report, available 
online at http://www.gatesfoundation.org.  Figures for comparison from the OECD donor 
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While the prominence of the Gates Foundation has by itself contributed to a 
heightened awareness of the influential role that private actors could play in 
shaping the future of development, this heavyweight is joined by a wide 
assortment of organisations whose growing engagement bring prospects for 
increased funding for development objectives as well as the introduction of 
innovative approaches in implementation. 
 
This discussion paper provides an overview of the global development 
engagement of non-state actors.  Although the label ‘non-state actor’ covers a 
large and heterogeneous group of organisations including civil society 
organisations, the analysis in this paper is restricted to three types of actors 
whose increased visibility presents opportunities and challenges for the 
traditional donor community, including the EU and its member states:  private 
foundations, corporate philanthropists, and global vertical programmes.   
 
As Grimm et al. (2009) suggest, the diversification of the landscape of 
development assistance providers has occurred against a backdrop of moves 
within the OECD DAC community to achieve a greater consistency in terms of the 
orienting goals and preferred means of implementing development assistance. 
With this in mind, the proliferation of the key actors involved in development 
cooperation carries the potential to undermine continued progress toward better 
coordinated and more effective development interventions.  Yet the ‘new’ actors 
might also provide a stimulus for improvements in how the traditional donor 
community responds to development problems.  
 
In outlining the scope of the engagement of key non-state actors, highlighting 
their funding priorities, and discussing the main elements of their implementation 
models, this paper aims to identify elements of their engagement that might be 
complementary with European development cooperation and those elements of 
their engagement that encourage reflection on how the EU and its member 
states might respond to their growing presence in the coming decade.  
 
2. Foundations in Global Development: Privately Promoting the Public 
Good?  
 
Existing research on the global development contribution of philanthropic 
foundations has emphasized that data on foundation activities in the developing 
world remains limited and that the impact of these actors on development 
outcomes is only now beginning to receive attention from researchers (OECD 
2003; Marten / Witte 2008;  Six / Küblböck 2009).  Part of the difficulty lies in 
the size of the foundation sector itself.  The European Foundation Centre 
identifies close to 100,000 ‘public interest’ foundations in the EU alone, while the 
US-based Foundation Center estimates the number of American grantmaking 
foundations at over 72,000 (European Foundation Centre 2008; Foundation 
Center 2008).  Even though only a relatively small percentage of these 
foundations support development work in some capacity (Six / Küblböck 2009), 
this more limited group also includes organisations that vary widely in size and in 
funding priorities. This section highlights some of the common characteristics of 
                                                                                                                                                        
community are from the OECD’s International Development Statistics Online 
(http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/5037721.htm). The Gates Foundation therefore also 
surpasses India, Brazil, and South Africa in terms of the scale of its giving.  
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philanthropic foundations, points out general trends in patterns of giving, and 
outlines key elements of the foundation model of providing financial support for 
development.  
 
2.1. Overview of the Foundation Sector 
 
The organisations identified as philanthropic foundations generally share the 
following properties: they are non-governmental; they are not profit-oriented; 
their resources stem from a private endowment; they are overseen by an 
independent oversight board (OECD 2003).  Foundations enjoy financial 
independence.  Their annual disbursements reflect only a small portion of their 
overall assets, which allows these organisations to generate income and to 
sustain their operations in perpetuity, though in some cases foundation 
benefactors may express a desire to spend down an endowment over a specific 
period of time.4 Financial independence in turn secures a high degree of decision-
making autonomy, leaving foundations free of the constraints that public actors 
face vis-à-vis taxpayers or corporations face vis-à-vis consumers or shareholders 
in making investment decisions.5
 
 However, restrictions imposed by recipient 
countries on how external actors can provide funding (for example, whether they 
are allowed to support civil society organisations promoting governance reforms) 
can apply to public and private actors alike. 
Foundations tend to have close ties to the localities where the corporations or 
individuals that have endowed them have accumulated their wealth. As a 
consequence, many foundations provide grants that are focused on their local 
communities, making international giving a lower priority.  A recent sample of 
foundation giving in Europe toward global development suggested that European 
foundations disbursed about 16 percent of their funding for development 
purposes in 2007 (Rukanova 2008), while  the Foundation Center (2009a) 
estimated that  American foundations provided only about 9 percent of their 
grant funding to non-US-based overseas recipients in 2007.6
 
  Recent estimates 
of the scale of giving in development nevertheless suggest that American 
foundations spend more overall on global development: in 2007, US Foundations 
spent some US$3.3 billion in developing countries, whereas  European 
foundations were estimated to have provided US$607 million in grants to the 
developing world in 2005 (Hudson Institute 2009). In both regions, there has 
been a recent upward trend in international giving, with the low percentages of 
giving directed toward development signalling the potential for mobilizing 
additional resources for development from foundations in the future.   
 
                                                 
4  The nature of this income depends on how the endowment is invested.  The global financial crisis 
impacted the asset bases of foundations: by the end of 2008, American foundations saw the size of 
their endowments drop by about one fifth (The Economist 2009).  Development programmes 
financed by the Kellogg Foundation were one casualty of shrinking foundation endowments in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis.  The foundation opted to suspend its operations in its Southern 
Africa office in October 2008.  See: 
http://www.wkkf.org/default.aspx?tabid=1163&ItemID=190&NID=312&LanguageID=0.  
5  This independence has fostered the perception that foundations can assume more risk in making 
investments in comparison to public actors (OECD 2003).   
6 This 9 percent figure is not specific to giving to developing countries. When international giving to 
US-based recipients is included, US Foundations allocated 22 percent of their grants internationally 
in 2006 (Foundation Center 2008).  
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Box 1 Tracking Private Giving in OECD Countries 
 
Since 2006, the Washington, DC-based Hudson Institute has published an annual 
Index of Global Philanthropy to chart private giving patterns.  Initially motivated 
by a desire to counter the perception of American stinginess in  development due 
to low levels of public giving as a share of national wealth, this report 
summarizes data on the volume of private financial flows across a number of 
categories, including direct investment, migrant remittances, and aid  from 
private voluntary organisations. The Index is notable for its attention to 
collecting figures on global giving from private foundations and data on corporate 
philanthropy. While the focus of the Index has been on US private giving, the 
Hudson Institute is also an advocate for extending data collection efforts on 
private giving around the world, including philanthropic activity originating from 
developing countries. The Foundation Center and the Committee Encouraging 
Corporate Philanthropy are other organisations in the United States tracking 
private giving efforts. The European Foundation Centre has sought to document 
resource allocation patterns among European foundations and outline guidelines 
for philanthropic engagement. Together with the US-based Council on 
Foundations, the European Foundation Centre has developed ‘Principles of 
Accountability for International Philanthropy’, which among other things 
highlights the importance of respecting local contexts and working together with 
other donors. Tracking patterns of resource allocation from the many varieties of 
private actors engaged in global development nevertheless remains difficult not 
only in source countries but also at the country level in the developing world.   
 
One of the main differences between the European and American foundation 
sectors is that US foundations are subject to more stringent financial reporting 
requirements; hence, there is a higher level of transparency about their activities 
(Witte 2008). Improving the quality of data on foundation giving in Europe 
through the formulation of consistent reporting standards across the EU would 
represent an important step in determining how foundation activities can best 
complement the global development efforts of the EU and its member states in 
the years ahead.  
 
2.2. Foundation Funding Priorities in Global Development 
 
One snapshot of the development-oriented giving patterns of the foundation 
sector can be obtained by looking at the funding priorities of the largest 
European and American foundations (listed in tables 1 and 2 below). Even among 
these major foundations, investments cover a range of activities, including 
agricultural development, small business development, disaster relief, and the 
promotion of good governance.  
 
A broader picture of the foundation sectors in Europe and the United States 
suggests some similarities in terms of general funding patterns.  The European 
Foundation Centre notes that nearly half of European foundations investing in 
global development programmes report that health and education are areas of 
special emphasis, while roughly one third of foundations surveyed indicated that 
economic and enterprise development and conflict resolution and peacebuilding 
were priority areas (Rukanova 2008).  The Hudson Institute’s most recent Index 
of Global Philanthropy underlines the importance of health investments for US-
based foundations.  Half of international giving from the US in 2007 was directed 
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toward health programmes, with support for economic growth and trade 
accounting for 25 percent of giving,  
 
Table 1. Leading European Foundations in Global Development (2005)  
Foundation Country Development 
Giving 2005 (in 
€) 
Focal Areas 
The Wellcome 
Trust 
United Kingdom 153,000,000 Health; Medical 
Research 
Deutsche Bank 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Germany 53,000,000 Microfinance; 
Education 
The Big Lottery 
Fund 
United Kingdom 35,200,000 Poverty 
Reduction; Post- 
Disaster Recovery 
Bernard van Leer 
Foundation 
Netherlands 15,559,537 Support for  
Children 
Shell Foundation United Kingdom 12,320,000 SMEs; Urban 
Pollution; Energy 
Notes: This table is based on a list presented in Marten / Witte (2008) that reports results from a 
European Foundation Centre survey on giving for global development.  Areas of thematic 
concentration are based on information available on the websites of the foundations listed.  
 
 
Table 2. Leading American Foundations in Global Development (2007) 
Foundation State Development 
Giving 
(in US$)  
Focal Areas 
Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation 
Washington 628,313,243 Health; Agriculture; 
Financial Services  
The William and Flora 
Hewlitt Foundation 
California 58,794,800 Environment; 
Agricultural Markets; 
Governance 
W.K. Kellogg Foundation Michigan 45,785,385 Racial Inequality; 
Leadership; 
Community 
Development 
The Rockefeller 
Foundation 
New York 36,575,358 Agriculture; Climate 
Resilience; 
Innovation 
The Ford Foundation New York 27,815,140 Governance; Civil 
Society; Human 
Rights 
Notes: Figures are from Foundation Center (2009b) and include grants of US$10,000 or more. 
Information on priority areas has been collected from the websites of the individual foundations.  
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Table 3. Leading Recipients of Global Development Grants from US Foundations 
(2007) 
Organisation Location Grant Total 
(in US$) 
Grants 
Alliance for a Green Revolution in 
Africa 
Kenya 188,951,463 4 
Technoserve United States 48,978,601 8 
International Maize and Wheat 
Improvement Center 
Mexico 44,558,906 4 
Heifer Project International United States 43,453,930 13 
African Agricultural Technology 
Foundation 
Kenya 42,450,000 1 
International Development 
Research Centre of Canada 
Canada 40,000,000 1 
International Development 
Enterprises 
United States 27,303,863 5 
Catholic Relief Services United States 24,318,443 8 
ONE Campaign United States 22,997,183 3 
Save the Children Federation United States 22,768,689 30 
Note: This table is a partial reproduction of the Foundation Center’s list of “Top 25 Recipients of 
Foundation Giving for Poverty-Related Programs for Developing Countries, circa 2007”. Dollar 
amounts include grants of US$10,000 or more. Only seven of the 25 recipient organisations on this 
list are located in developing countries (Foundation Center 2009c). This table has been reproduced 
with the permission of the Foundation Center.  
 
disaster relief and refugee assistance representing 9 percent, support for 
democracy promotion and governance programs around 7 percent, and 
education four percent of total giving (Hudson Institute 2009).7
 
 The list of 
leading recipients in Table 3 also highlights that many of the most sizable grants 
with a poverty reduction orientation from US foundations have been directed 
toward research-focused initiatives, particularly those related to increasing 
agricultural productivity.  
In a recent summary of the foundation sector’s favoured giving areas, Witte 
(2008) notes that investments in the health field have tended to focus on vaccine 
development and immunisation, as well as prevention and treatment for malaria, 
tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS. Foundation investments in education have 
emphasised tertiary education, while governance programmes have often 
focused on strengthening the capacity of civil society organisations to make 
governments more accountable and to demand political change (Witte 2008).  
The agricultural sector provides one of the most prominent examples of 
foundations contributing to global development efforts by making large, risky, 
and long-term investments: the agricultural research funded by the Rockefeller 
and Ford Foundations that led to the development of higher-yield crops to 
support a ‘Green Revolution’ in Asia and Latin America (OECD 2003).  
 
The traditional preference of foundations for giving locally also extends to their 
international funding efforts.  The Foundation Center notes that international 
grants that were given directly to foreign partners accounted for only 45% of 
grant dollars in 2006, though this marks an improvement over previous years: in 
                                                 
7 The Hudson Institute notes that the economic growth and trade category includes environmental 
grants as well, suggesting that this category itself covers a broad range of investments.  
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1990 only around one third of international foundation grants were distributed 
directly to foreign recipients (Foundation Center 2008). In the international 
giving portfolio of American foundations, over half of the grants to foreign 
recipients pass through Western Europe, a result partly attributable to foundation 
support for the global programmes that are based there.   
 
Sub-Saharan Africa is the leading developing region in terms of the support that 
it attracts from US foundations. In 2006, roughly US$344 million was disbursed 
to organisations in the region. Sub-Saharan Africa is also a preferred destination 
for development funding from European foundations, with organisations in 
countries in Eastern and Southern Africa being especially privileged as grant 
recipients (Rukanova 2008).  Foundation giving in Africa may be heavily 
concentrated in a relatively small number of countries.  In 2007, the Foundation 
Center reported that Angola was the beneficiary of some US$200 million in 
grants from US foundations, representing more than half of identified foundation 
giving toward the continent. Kenya was another leading beneficiary, accounting 
for more than 35 percent of reported grants to Africa in that year.8
 
 
In addition to these general trends, a bias in foundation giving to emerging 
countries has been discernable, as US foundations in particular have tended to 
provide significant support to programmes in Brazil, China, India, and South 
Africa (Marten/Witte 2008). Possible explanations for this tendency may be a 
greater familiarity with the operating environment in these countries or the 
relative ease of identifying partner organisations as compared with the situation 
in the least developed countries.  
 
2.3. Foundation Implementation Models  
 
Identifying reliable partner organisations is a necessity for many foundations due 
to their own limited capacity for implementation, but this generalisation does not 
hold for all foundations.  While some foundations are essentially grant making 
institutions, others have field offices that manage operational activities in 
developing countries (OECD 2003). Marten and Witte suggest that the more 
detached relationship between financing and implementation tends to be more 
common in the global development arena, however, noting that: “the reality is 
that foundations themselves are frequently highly centralized, have little to no 
field presence and frequently have underdeveloped professional organisational 
structures” (2008: 18). These characteristics can contribute to a reduced 
capacity both to monitor the activities that foundations fund and to coordinate 
these initiatives with partner country governments and other donors.9
                                                 
8 See http://maps.foundationcenter.org/gpf/poverty.php. The position of Angola as a leading 
recipient of US foundation giving for poverty reduction in Africa highlights the relevance of 
enhancing transparency in private philanthropy. Angola is an important country of operations for 
US energy companies.  It is also a country where the President has personally established a 
foundation (the Dos Santos Foundation) to address social development problems, an organisation 
which can be considered to be an extension of a clientelist regime (Amundsen / Abreu 2006).  
Greater transparency is required to ensure that contributions that are labelled as charitable which 
may in addition limit the tax liabilities of the funding source are actually financing initiatives for 
public benefit.  
  
9 This claim regarding foundation capacities is more relevant for some foundations than others.  
According to data compiled by Radelet (2003), several major foundations active in global 
development had a fund disbursement to staff ratio similar to leading development agencies.  By 
Radelet’s estimate, the Kellogg Foundation disbursed US$1.09 million, the David and Lucille 
 11 
 
In some corners of the development community, bureaucratic leanness combined 
with a certain distance between the source of financing and implementing agents 
in the ‘foundation model’ of development assistance provision has been 
considered to bring benefits in terms of producing more strongly demand-driven 
interventions. The assumption is that the organisations that generate proposals 
for funding are free to design programmes that are well-adapted to local needs 
and circumstances so long as they fit with the broad priorities set out by the 
funder (Lancaster 2000; van de Walle 2005).  While this model may fit the 
operational logic of public foundations, such as the African Development 
Foundation or Interamerican Foundation in the United States, the extent of its 
approximation of the implementation model of the largest private foundations 
active in global development is unclear, as grant-making institutions may in 
reality have very specific wishes in terms of where they want to allocate 
resources. The level of responsiveness of foundations to needs articulated by 
stakeholders in developing countries should provide a measure of their 
legitimacy in advancing priorities in the name of public interest.   
 
2.4. The Gates Foundation: A Titan among Philanthropies  
 
Growing interest in the role of private philanthropy in global development is in 
large measure a result of the significant investments being poured into 
development initiatives by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The Gates 
Foundation’s Global Health and Global Development Programmes are still in their 
infancy, but have already provided an important source of additional 
development finance in their first years of operation.  In 2008 both programmes 
provided a volume of grants around 1.5 times higher than in the previous year, 
with Global Health funding reaching nearly US$1.82 billion and Global 
Development funding US$462 million (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 2008). 
This substantial growth in development financing from one year to the next 
signals the foundation’s potential to become an even more significant global 
development actor in the coming decade.  
 
A quick comparison of Tables 1 and 2 with Tables 4 and 5 below highlights the 
disproportionate weight of the Gates Foundation as a development actor in the 
foundation sector.  The largest grants provided by the foundation directed toward 
Africa, its priority region for grantmaking, are comparable in size to the total 
grantmaking portfolios of other leading foundations active in the development 
arena.  
 
Many of the basic guiding orientations of the Gates Foundation, such as the 
recognition that all lives have an equal value, that it is necessary to make long-
term commitments in order to foster development, and that resources should be 
invested efficiently underline the consistency of the mission of the foundation 
with the orientations of other development actors, including European aid 
agencies. Nevertheless, the foundation’s work is fundamentally an expression of 
the interests of its founders, as its strong emphasis on science and technology as 
                                                                                                                                                        
Packard Foundation US$1.44 million, and the Ford Foundation US$1.55 million per staff member.  
Figures for USAID, DfID, and the World Bank were US$1.27 million, US$1.47 million, and US$1.95 
million per staff member, respectively.  An outlier among leading foundations was the Gates 
Foundation, which disbursed US$4.25 million per staff member.  
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avenues for expanding opportunities reveals.10
 
 These differences in interests may 
be especially visible when the foundation undertakes advocacy to shape the 
funding priorities of public organisations, whose interests reflect attempts to 
accommodate a range of governmental and societal preferences.  These different 
bases of interests can lead to frustrations on both sides.  From the foundation 
side, public actors may be perceived as too slow to act, while public actors may 
criticise the insistency of the foundation in promoting its favoured approaches.  
Table 4.  Leading Recipients of Gates Foundation Global Health Grants (Africa) 
2008 
 
Organisation Location Grant Total 
(in US$) 
% of 
Africa 
Total 
Program for Appropriate 
Technology in Health (PATH) 
United States 168,731,152 32.1 
The Carter Center United States 40,000,000 7.6 
INDEPTH Network Ghana 28,615,240 5.4 
CDC Foundation United States 25,495,068 4.8 
Bloomberg Family Foundation United States 23,875,000 4.5 
UNICEF Headquarters United States 19,999,744 3.8 
Global Alliance for Improved 
Nutrition 
Switzerland 19,999,120 3.8 
University of California-Davis United States 15,906,400 3.0 
World Health Organization Switzerland 13,839,336 2.6 
Accordia Global Health Foundation United States 12,574,116 2.4 
Source: http://www.gatesfoundation.org/grants/Pages/search.aspx.  The table is based on grants 
listed following a search using the filters ‘Global Health’ and ‘Africa’.  The total volume of grants 
listed with these search terms was US$526,361,535.  
 
Table 5. Leading Recipients of Gates Foundation Global Development Grants 
(Africa) 2008 
 
Organisation Location Grant Total 
(in US$) 
% of 
Africa 
Total 
United Nations World Food 
Programme 
Italy 66,131,200 10.6 
International Food Policy Research 
Institute 
United States 45,000,000 7.2 
African Agricultural Technology 
Foundation 
Kenya 42,450,000 6.8 
Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ) 
Germany 34,995,552 5.6 
Cornell University United States 26,830,848 4.3 
The McKnight Foundation United States 26,006,932 4.2 
Deutsche Investitions und 
Entwicklungsgesellschaft  
Germany 24,400,000 3.9 
                                                 
10 The full list of the Gates Foundation’s guiding principles appears on the organisation’s website: 
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/about/Pages/guiding-principles.aspx 
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National Science Foundation United States 24,000,000 3.9 
Global Alliance for Livestock 
Veterinary Medicine 
United Kingdom 22,515,040 3.6 
International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development 
United States 18,905,140 3.0 
Source: http://www.gatesfoundation.org/grants/Pages/search.aspx.  The table is based on grants 
listed following a search using the filters ‘Global Development’ and ‘Africa’.  The total volume of 
grants listed with these search terms was US$621,541,046.  
 
The Gates Foundation focuses its grantmaking activities in its Global Health and 
Global Development programmes in several priority areas. A key emphasis in the 
health category is investing in combating a variety of infectious diseases, for 
example by funding research on vaccine development, and also by supporting 
initiatives to improve health care delivery. The Global Development Programme 
prioritizes investments in improving agricultural productivity and rural 
livelihoods, expanding the access of the poor to financial services (especially 
through support for microfinance institutions), and also funds a variety of special 
initiatives, including a programme promoting wider availability of information 
technology in libraries around the world as well as support for emergency 
relief.11
 
 Advocacy work constitutes an additional component of both the Global 
Health and Global Development programmes.  
As a grantmaking institution, the Gates Foundation relies on other organisations 
to implement the programmes that it funds.  Tables 4 and 5, which provide a list 
of the top 10 recipients of grants directed toward Africa in the Global Health and 
Global Development programmes in 2008, give a general impression of where 
the foundation’s resources are directed.12 Implementing partners include 
multilateral organisations and other governmental actors, other foundations, 
universities, and a variety of non-governmental organisations. One striking 
feature of these lists, mirrored in the complete list of grants for Africa, is the 
predominance of organisations headquartered in North America and Europe. In 
the Global Development programme, recipients in these regions received 63% of 
the grants for African development.  Multilateral organisations received 
approximately 16%, while seven grant recipients headquartered in Africa 
received just under 11% of the total grant volume.13
 
 A similar picture emerges 
with respect to funding for Global Health initiatives with an Africa focus. In this 
domain, North American and European recipients attracted 76% of grant 
funding, multilateral organisations approximately 12%, and implementing 
partners headquartered in Africa 9%.  
There are multiple plausible explanations for the relatively low levels of funding 
flowing directly to African recipients.  The figures may reflect an orientation 
toward the production of global public goods, as in the area of research for 
vaccine development, a tendency to entrust funds to organisations which are 
more familiar to the individuals working at the foundation, or limits to the ability 
of organisations based in Africa to absorb the large volumes of funding that the 
                                                 
11 More information regarding these priority areas is available on the Gates Foundation website.  
12 In some cases, grants listed with the search filter ‚Africa’ in the Gates Foundation grantee 
database may actually relate to broader programmes that are relevant for multiple developing 
regions.  
13 These grants were disbursed to recipients in a small number of Anglophone countries (Kenya, 
Nigeria, South Africa, and Tanzania).  The remaining grants were provided to organisations in Asia 
and Latin America.  
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Gates Foundation is providing. Whatever the case, if the organisation is 
committed to the principle of ownership in development and to the 
empowerment of developing country populations, increasing the importance of 
Southern partners in its grantmaking portfolio seems a natural objective.  
Movement in this direction would also enhance the legitimacy of the development 
advocacy work conducted by the foundation.  
 
Given the focus of the Gates Foundation on financing research initiatives, one 
thematic area where European donors can work more closely with the foundation 
to support this objective is the strengthening of developing country research 
capacities. As Stamm (2008) suggests, while European aid agencies have 
acknowledged the importance of building research capacity in partner countries, 
this priority has often lacked visibility in development programmes as well as 
financial support.  The development of a common strategy and common 
mechanisms for providing support for research institutions outside of Europe and 
North America would provide a means for elevating the priority while 
encouraging knowledge transfer from organisations that have had more 
experience working on this problem to the foundation.  
 
While Gates Foundation initiatives have unquestionably been welcomed in many 
quarters, numerous criticisms of foundation action have also emerged in its short 
lifetime.  In part, this criticism reflects challenges of a newcomer entering an 
unfamiliar operational environment, but the criticisms also reflect more general 
dilemmas of engaging in development work that traditional donors have 
confronted in various forms for many years.  The observation that the 
foundation’s investment portfolio has included investments in enterprises whose 
actions potentially undercut development objectives mirrors the challenge of 
policy coherence that donor countries continue to struggle with, for example.14
 
  
A more prominent criticism that the foundation and the donor community should 
work together to address relates to the imbalances that have emerged in 
addressing development objectives due to the foundation’s funding priorities.  In 
particular, the foundation’s emphasis on combating high-profile diseases through 
vaccination and drug delivery has been criticized for drawing attention away from 
primary health care and undermining national health systems.15
 
  At the same 
time, funding to address the underlying forces that can improve health outcomes 
such as improvements in infrastructure and food security has been neglected 
(Piller and Smith 2007). Though investments in the foundation’s Global 
Development programme are designed to address these broader development 
challenges, this criticism highlights that emerging private actors may be 
disadvantaged in terms of their ability to promote the kinds of holistic 
approaches to development that aid agencies often advocate.  
2.5. Looking Toward the Future: Implications for Europe  
 
While the funds that individual foundations provide in support of global 
development objectives are generally small in relation to the amounts of 
                                                 
14 Numerous criticisms of the foundation are discussed in ‚Monopol der Weltverbesserer’, Die Zeit 
(September 25, 2008).  The article is accessible online at http://www.zeit.de/2008/40/Gates-
Foundation.  
15  This criticism, particularly as it relates to funding for HIV/AIDS, also applies to the donor 
community more broadly (Smith 2009).  
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financing provided by official donors, the concentration of their activities in 
particular sectors or particular countries can increase the prospects for changing 
the nature of the operating environment that donors will face at the country 
level. Although foundations may themselves display a preference for avoiding 
coordination due to their autonomy, scepticism of national-level planning 
processes and governmental solutions, or their reliance on civil society 
organisations as implementing partners (Marten/Witte 2008), it is in the interest 
of both private and public actors to ensure that their interventions have a 
complementary quality. This does not mean that priorities or mechanisms for 
implementation need to be identical, but implies that channels for dialogue about 
how to invest in development and how to assess the impact of these investments 
should be increasingly formalised.  
 
A prerequisite for better understanding the implications of the rise of these 
private actors for European development cooperation is enhanced transparency 
about where their funding is directed. As a regulatory actor, the European Union 
has the ability to promote more comprehensive financial reporting from 
organisations under its legal jurisdiction. At the same time, the EU can work 
together with the European Foundation Centre, an independent philanthropic 
industry association, to monitor contributions to global development objectives 
more closely and identify principles for coordination with governmental actors.16
 
  
The need to monitor philanthropic activities more carefully extends to the 
organisations that implement projects funded by private foundations. Many of 
these organisations may also receive funding from public sources; hence there is 
a broader justification for increasing accountability.  Donors can play a role in 
increasing the call for the collection of data on the activities of implementing 
partners in order to better understand the impact of these interventions.  
It is important to underline that private foundations are political actors because 
the financing that they provide for development programmes carries the 
potential to privilege certain policy areas or populations over others and to affect 
power relationships within countries.  For this simple reason, donors should 
strive to increase their awareness of philanthropic giving and its effects in the 
years ahead.    
 
3. Corporate Philanthropy: Blurring Boundaries between Business and 
Aid 
 
Many of the largest European foundations engaging in global development are 
affiliated with corporations, as Table 1 suggests. Corporate philanthropic activity 
is not restricted to funding channelled through foundations, however. As with 
foundation activity, the full scale of giving from private enterprises is difficult to 
assess due to limited data availability, although figures for giving in the United 
States are again more readily available than figures on corporate giving in 
Europe. This section highlights general trends in corporate giving for 
development and describes key aspects of how this funding is provided.  
 
 
                                                 
16 Marten and Witte (2008) propose a similar set of recommendations to increase donor knowledge 
about foundation activities.  
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3.1 Overview of Corporate Giving in the Developing World 
 
According to estimates in the Hudson Institute’s Index on Global Philanthropy, 
American corporations contributed US$6.8 billion toward global development 
goals in 2007, increasing their spending in developing countries by 24 percent in 
comparison to the previous year (Hudson Institute 2009). A recent survey of 
companies in the network of the US-based Committee Encouraging Corporate 
Philanthropy, an organisation promoting business giving and developing 
standards for best practice in this community, suggested that firms are likely to 
continue to expand their international giving profiles in the future as a result of 
the growing internationalisation of their operations (Steger 2006). Motives for 
corporate giving include improving employee morale or enhancing the reputation 
of the company either in the community where its activities are focused or in the 
broader marketplace (Asinof 2007).  
 
Mirroring trends in foundation giving described above, however, corporate giving 
that is directed internationally continues to represent a small portion of the total 
philanthropic engagement of the business community.  A report on giving trends 
of American companies based on a survey of 137 firms indicated that for Fortune 
100 companies, about 18 percent of corporate giving was distributed 
internationally, while for other companies, around 11 percent of total giving went 
abroad (Committee Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy 2009).  While US$6.8 
billion is an impressive figure, it is a small sum compared to the revenue of the 
universe of corporations that have the potential to make charitable contributions.   
 
The Hudson Institute’s most recent estimates of corporate giving volumes 
indicate that contributions to the health sector have represented an especially 
important share of private philanthropy globally due to a high level of in-kind 
donations from pharmaceutical and medical companies, which have been 
directed overwhelmingly toward countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Hudson 
Institute 2009).  Firms engaging in philanthropic activities in developing 
countries nevertheless span a variety of sectors, including energy, 
telecommunications, financial services, and manufacturing.  The diffuse quality of 
corporate philanthropists suggests that problems related to monitoring the 
extent and effectiveness of their activities are larger in comparison to the 
foundation sector, dominated by a smaller number of more visible actors.  As 
exemplified in the Hudson Institute’s work on the subject, evidence on the 
impact of programmes supported by charitable contributions from firms tends to 
be anecdotal, underlining the need for more systematic appraisals of the 
development impact of private philanthropy.  
 
3.2 Recent Innovations in Giving 
 
Given the incomplete quality of information about the effectiveness of corporate 
philanthropic efforts in promoting development goals, discussions of this form of 
private giving have tended to focus on the potential rather than on the actual 
impact of the new philanthropists as development actors.  While philanthropy 
from firms can take a variety of forms, including traditional means of assistance 
such as in-kind donations of their products or contributions to humanitarian 
organisations, one reason for the growing interest in the role of corporate 
philanthropies as development actors is the perception that they are innovative 
players in the development landscape that are promoting fundamentally new 
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models of providing assistance (Nelson 2008).  A central element of these 
models is the extension of business principles to charitable endeavours, an 
approach captured by the broad term ‘philanthrocapitalism’ (Edwards 2009).  
 
The more visible marriage of business and philanthropic practice has come partly 
through the increasing popularity of so-called ‘strategic philanthropy’ among 
firms.  The core element of strategic philanthropy is the effort to increase the 
alignment of philanthropic activities with firms’ core business competencies.  In 
contrast to more arms-length giving that might be typified by cash contributions 
to disaster relief funds, strategic philanthropy implies the development of 
targeted initiatives designed to enhance competitiveness by funding 
improvements in a company’s operating environment (Porter / Kremer 2002; 
Bruch / Walter 2005). Corporate investments in education or other social welfare 
programmes in areas where their operations are located provides an example of 
this approach to giving.  Through such investments, the firm potentially gains a 
better educated and more productive work force, while participants in these 
programmes have opportunities to gain skills and improve their living conditions.  
 
A more concrete example of strategic philanthropy in practice can be found in 
the Networking Academies established by the information technology company 
CISCO Systems (Porter/ Kremer 2002). Initially designed to provide recipients in 
disadvantaged communities within the United States with skills to benefit from 
donated technologies, the programme has acquired a global reach within the 
past decade, and now provides training opportunities for some 800,000 
individuals through 9,000 networking academies spread out across 165 
countries.17
 
 The expansion of the programme has been facilitated in part through 
partnerships with bilateral and multilateral development organisations such as 
USAID and the UNDP.  As this example suggests, partnerships with firms can 
provide a vehicle for extending programmes and the financial resources and 
know-how that they carry with them to regions or communities that aid agencies 
may be accustomed to operating in, but where corporate actors are at a potential 
disadvantage in terms of their contextual knowledge.   
For both private and public actors these types of arrangements provide a 
mechanism for transferring knowledge and for exploiting comparative strengths.  
Seizing the potential for a larger contribution of firms to global development 
efforts likely requires not only strengthening programmes in aid agencies aimed 
at creating partnerships with private sector actors but also targeted outreach to 
corporations to promote a greater awareness of the benefits of cooperation.  
Without an outreach effort from the traditional development actors, there is a 
risk that corporations will simply pursue programmes independently, leading to a 
multiplication of small projects that may not adequately incorporate lessons 
learned through the accumulated experiences of development agencies or link up 
to ongoing projects within the same region. As it is unrealistic to expect agencies 
with limited resources to conduct extensive corporate outreach, such efforts can 
be focused on providing information to business associations within Europe, 
especially those whose members include multinational companies with operations 
in developing countries.  
 
 
                                                 
17  More information about this programme can be found online: 
http://www.cisco.com/web/learning/netacad/academy/index.html.  
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Box 2 The Many Dimensions of Corporate Engagement in Development 
 
Charitable contributions to development projects represent just one of several 
ways that corporations can support efforts to address global development 
challenges. Firms may also enhance their development orientation by adhering to 
international standards such as the environmental management standards 
elaborated by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) or the 
guidelines for making socially and environmentally responsible investments 
articulated in the Equator Principles.  Beyond integrating socially and 
environmentally benign business practice into their core operations, firms also 
have the potential to contribute to development goals as political advocates in 
their home countries for global public policies that affect the lives of the world’s 
poor, including policies designed to address the climate challenge or to create a 
more equitable global trade regime (European Think-Tanks Group 2010; Warren 
2007). A challenge for European donors is to exploit interest in charitable giving 
in the development field as an entry point for promoting broader changes within 
the private sector that can provide a foundation for a sustainable global economy 
in the future.  
 
Venture philanthropy is another emerging approach that provides a new model 
for how firms may provide charitable assistance. Considered to represent a 
departure from traditional forms of foundation giving where there is a larger 
distance between grantmaking institutions and the organisations they finance, 
venture philanthropy describes an arrangement where philanthropists take an 
active role in the management of their non-profit implementing partners to 
contribute not only project financing but also to capacity building within the 
implementing organisation, and combines the results-orientation and knowledge 
transfer emphasis of venture capitalism with a focus on producing social benefits 
(Letts / Ryan / Grossman 1997; Pepin 2005).  
 
As Pepin (2005) indicates, the venture philanthropy model has primarily found 
traction in the United States and Canada, though the popularity of the model has 
been increasing in the United Kingdom and other European countries as well.  
Like other corporate philanthropic activities, the extension of this model to the 
global development sphere has been limited to date. A prominent exception is 
the work of the US-based Acumen Fund, established in 2001 with financial 
support from foundations and other philanthropists.18  A core assumption guiding 
the work of the Acumen Fund is that entrepreneurship can play a key role in 
improving the lives of the world’s poor.  The Fund provides loans and equity 
investments to small enterprises whose operations focus on service delivery for 
poor populations, whether by producing bed nets or extending access to health 
care, supplying electricity, or improving water quality. The organisation’s 
investments, which are concentrated in India, Pakistan, Kenya, Tanzania, and 
South Africa, are spread out across five portfolios (health, housing, energy, 
water, and agriculture), and currently represent some US$35 million in 
commitments, the largest share of which are directed toward enterprises 
providing health care-related services.19
 
 
The geographical and financial limitations in the scope of venture philanthropy in 
developing countries suggests that these new actors are not close to displacing 
                                                 
18 For further information about the Acumen Fund, see http://www.acumenfund.org.  
19 See http://www.acumenfund.org/investments/portfolios.html.  
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more traditional development actors.  Their entry onto the global development 
stage nevertheless poses a number of questions for aid agencies.  Given the 
entrepreneurial emphasis of the new philanthropists, donors will need to consider 
how to engage with these actors in the context of their own programmes to 
support small and medium-sized enterprise development. At the same time, the 
focus on private sector solutions raises broader questions about how to promote 
accountability among this diffuse group of actors and opens a debate on how to 
find a balance between the role of the state and the role of the private sector in 
promoting development outcomes (Edwards 2009). If the new philanthropists 
have yet to demonstrate how their interventions can be scaled up to contribute 
to more widespread social and economic transformation processes in developing 
countries, donors can already begin to identify points of ‘strategic 
complementarity’ between donor and philanthropic efforts, which implies a 
willingness to increase information sharing on development activities from both 
sets of actors to avoid duplication at a minimum and to ideally build synergies 
that benefit developing country populations (Brainard / LaFleur 2009).   
 
3.3 Looking toward the Future: Implications for Europe 
 
The promise of the new philanthropy is that it will provide an infusion of 
resources and expertise that can help to address persistent development 
challenges.  While the extent of corporate philanthropy in developing countries 
continues to be limited, the philanthropic sector has tremendous growth 
potential. However, the same forces that dissuade firms from investing in 
developing country contexts are likely to curb philanthropic interest in more 
difficult operating environments. This suggests that in the near term, such 
initiatives will probably be concentrated in developing countries that are already 
relatively more attractive to investors, especially middle-income countries. 
 
European aid donors have an important role to play in increasing the global 
development contribution of corporate actors.  The role of aid agencies as 
knowledge providers is especially important in this regard, as donors can provide 
contextual information that can help potential philanthropists to identify 
prospects for project success before they invest and can help to identify areas of 
complementarity with existing interventions from states, donors, or other private 
actors. Information sharing can also take the form of promoting standards of 
conduct for corporate philanthropists in developing country contexts, which can 
involve the identification of measures that can be taken to enhance 
accountability among private givers to ensure responsiveness to stakeholder 
demands. One basic component of fostering greater accountability among 
philanthropists entering the global development landscape is to monitor 
corporate giving patterns more closely. Increasing research and analysis on 
corporate philanthropy provides one avenue for European donors to enhance 
their monitoring efforts (Edwards 2009); making use of the regulatory roles of 
the EU and its member states to encourage more comprehensive reporting 
provides another.  
 
Efforts to increase the volume and quality of corporate giving in developing 
countries can be viewed as an extension of existing initiatives (such as the UN 
Global Compact) to encourage firms to become better global citizens by 
integrating principles of corporate social responsibility into their core operations.  
Long-term efforts to address global development goals will undoubtedly require 
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increased commitments from private sector actors, which apart from serving as 
motors for wealth and employment creation also have a key role to play in 
ensuring the sustainable management of natural resources and the improvement 
of living standards.  Information exchange between aid agencies and the new 
corporate philanthropists related to implementation of global giving programmes 
is one element in improving broader corporate contributions to global 
development processes. However, donors can also encourage further 
engagement from the business community by funding programmes that allow 
firms to identify opportunities for cooperation with developing country partners.  
Challenge funds to stimulate business-to-business partnerships provide one 
example of such programmes (European Think-Tanks Group 2010).  
 
This brief overview of global private giving patterns suggests that the giving 
profiles of the new corporate philanthropists in particular are likely to focus on 
the issues or regions that are closely associated with the business agendas of 
individual firms.  This can have advantages in terms of promoting sustained 
corporate engagement and skills transfer, but can also raise challenges related to 
the multiplication of small development initiatives and a neglect of particular 
issue areas, especially those related to the provision of global public goods. 
Intensified dialogue between European donors and the private sector would likely 
contribute to the enhancement of the scope and quality of corporate engagement 
in global development.   
 
4. Global Vertical Programmes: Extensions of the Existing Aid System 
 
Global vertical programmes have gained prominence in the global development 
landscape in recent years in part due to their potential to address problems 
related to project proliferation and funding shortfalls referenced above.  Such 
programmes are considered to provide a mechanism for mobilizing additional 
financial resources from both private and public actors to provide a focal point for 
addressing a narrow set of objectives. In focusing on a limited number of 
objectives, these initiatives are distinguished from the horizontal programming of 
aid agencies that attempts to respond to challenges across numerous sectors 
simultaneously. This section provides descriptions of key vertical programmes 
and their priority areas of emphasis and general characteristics before 
highlighting the main issues that the programmes raise for European donors.  
 
 
 
Table 6.  Areas of emphasis and funding volumes from major global vertical 
funds 
 
Fund  Found
ed  
Focal Area Disburse
ments to 
Date  
(in US$) 
Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) 
1971 Agricultural 
Research 
7.2 billion 
Education for All-Fast Track 
Initiative  (EFA-FTI) 
2002 Universal Primary 
Education 
.87 billion 
GAVI Alliance 2000 Vaccination 3.8 billion  
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Global Environmental Facility 1991 Biodiversity, 
Climate Change, 
Water and Land 
Degradation 
8.3 billion 
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis, and Malaria 
2002  AIDS, TB, Malaria, 
Vaccine-Preventable 
Diseases 
7.2 billion 
The President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
2003 HIV/AIDs 
Prevention, 
Treatment, and 
Care 
12.7 
billion  
Notes: The figure for CGIAR (reported in 1990 constant USD) is referenced on the Consortium’s 
homepage at: http://www.cgiar.org/impact/snapshots_impacts.html. The EFA-FTI disbursement 
figure covers cumulative disbursements from its Catalytic Fund (US$792 million) and from its 
Education Programme Development Fund (US$75.5 million) as reported in its most recent financial 
updates available on the fund’s website (http://www.educationfasttrack.org/). The GAVI figure 
reflects cumulative commitments from donors through 2008 rather than disbursements, and can be 
found in GAVI (2009).  Global Fund figure is from Global Fund (2009). For the Global 
Environmental Facility, please see http://www.gefweb.org/interior_right.aspx?id=50.  The PEPFAR 
figure includes outlays for fiscal years 2004-2008 listed at 
http://www.pepfar.gov/documents/organization/123761.pdf.  
 
4.1. A Brief Inventory of Global Vertical Programmes 
 
As is the case with other groups of ‘new actors’ that are profiled in this research 
programme, global vertical programmes are not a purely new feature of the 
development landscape.  The smallpox eradication programme established by the 
World Health Organisation in 1958 is credited with having eliminated this disease 
worldwide (EURODAD 2008), while the Consultative Group on International 
Agricultural Research (CGIAR) is close to forty years old and the Global 
Environmental Facility has been around for nearly two decades.  Though they 
have a similar sector-specific orientation, programmes labelled vertical funds do 
not have uniform systems of governance or mechanisms for implementing 
assistance.  This section briefly outlines the key features of the individual vertical 
programmes listed in Table 6.  
 
The establishment of CGIAR represented an extension of foundation-funded 
efforts to enhance agricultural productivity in developing countries through 
investments in research on tropical agriculture. Contributors to the consortium’s 
work provide more than US$500 million annually in support of research at 15 
agricultural centres around the world. These contributors include 47 countries, 
including 22 DAC donor countries, 4 private foundations, and 13 regional and 
international organisations, which also participate in the governance of the 
consortium through representation in a consultative group that together with an 
independent scientific council provides strategic direction for the consortium’s 
activities.20
                                                 
20  More information about the consortium can be found at http://www.cgiar.org/index.html.  
  Although CGIAR’s work since its inception has been widely praised 
for demonstrating a clear impact in improving agricultural yields and enhancing 
food security through its research output, a World Bank evaluation conducted in 
2003 noted that the nature of donor engagement in the consortium’s activities 
had contributed to a shift in priorities away from CGIAR’s core areas of 
competence (scientific production) toward service provision to compensate for 
dwindling investments related to other means of increasing food security (World 
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Bank 2003). This example suggests the challenges that global programmes can 
face in the long-term in maintaining a focus on a relatively narrow set of 
priorities given changing preferences from funders and changes in the nature of 
needs in developing countries themselves.  
 
The Global Environmental Facility (GEF) emerged from a heightened 
awareness of the necessity for cooperation between developed and developing 
countries in resolving global environmental problems, particularly as a result of 
negotiations to protect the ozone layer in the 1980s. Initially developed under 
the aegis of the World Bank, early criticisms of the initiative’s legitimacy from 
civil society organisations and developing countries prodded reforms that led to 
the development of a more transparent and inclusive system of governance 
combining aspects of Bretton Woods and UN organisations (Streck 2001).    
 
The GEF has mainly served as a financing vehicle for small-scale projects. In its 
2007-2008 reporting period, the GEF provided US$634 million of its own 
resources and mobilized US$3.1 billion through cofinancing to support 185 
projects, primarily to address challenges related to biodiversity, climate change, 
persistent organic pollutants, international waters, and land degradation.  
Recognizing the value of more integrated approaches to environmental 
protection, the GEF has recently demonstrated an interest in increasing funding 
for  long-term programmes that serve as umbrellas for smaller projects (GEF 
2008).  While the GEF has worked to reform its project approval process in order 
to streamline funding applications and enable a quicker disbursement of funds, 
the inclusive quality of the facility’s governance structure has also had the effect 
of slowing decision-making, potentially making it more difficult for the facility to 
respond quickly to environmental challenges in the future.  Other critical points 
related to the GEF’s capacity to fulfil its mandate concern inadequate financing 
and a perceived absence of strategic direction in dealing with climate change in 
particular (Porter et al. 2008). These criticisms do not simply reflect the GEF’s 
internal weaknesses, but instead indicate that prospects for success are 
conditioned by how donors engage with the fund.  This concerns financial 
commitments as well as coherence in terms of the direction provided by major 
stakeholders.  
 
The Education for All-Fast Track Initiative has its roots in the international 
conferences at the turn of the Millennium calling for increased commitments to 
responding to basic social development needs, and extending access to basic 
education more specifically.  Considering itself a ‘global compact’, this 
programme aims to mobilize funding in support of national education plans from 
existing bilateral and multilateral donors. Because the initiative focuses on 
providing funding for programmes elaborated at the country level, it has served 
to promote country ownership and enhanced donor coordination within the 
education sector. Although donor commitments to basic education have 
increased since the initiative’s inception, its low profile outside of the context of 
existing development partnerships has made it difficult to mobilize resources on 
the scale needed to address financing gaps in dealing with basic education 
challenges (Fry 2008).  
 
The recent attention focused on global vertical funds owes especially to the 
significant increases in funding in the health sector that have been channelled 
through vertical programmes such as the GAVI Alliance, the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and America’s PEPFAR programme. Interest in 
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funding initiatives in this sector has itself followed from aid effectiveness 
concerns and the perception that health-related development investments have 
had more demonstrable effects in promoting development goals in comparison to 
other types of interventions.  
 
The Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations (GAVI Alliance) was 
founded in 1999 with support from a start-up grant of US$750 million from the 
Gates Foundation, which has remained a leading stakeholder alongside numerous 
donor countries.  Its work is linked to the achievement of MDG 4 on child health 
and focuses on increasing access to vaccines in low-income countries. Between 
2000 and 2008, 63 percent of its funds financed the uptake of new or underused 
vaccines, while another 19 percent went toward immunisation support services 
and 12 percent toward health system strengthening (GAVI Alliance 2009). The 
Alliance’s work is guided by an oversight board including representatives from 
donor and developing country governments, multilateral agencies, the vaccine 
development industry, and a number of individuals represented in a private 
capacity.  
 
A central element of GAVI’s approach to promoting development has been its 
embrace of instruments taking inspiration from the private sector. One such 
instrument is the International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm), which 
uses long-term pledges of financial support from donors to raise capital from 
bonds on international markets to increase available resources in the near-term.  
Another market-focused instrument for increasing the capacity of the initiative to 
widen access to vaccines is the Advance Market Commitment Mechanism (ACM).  
The ACM aims to encourage vaccine development by offering a financial 
guarantee for eventual demand.21
 
 At the same time that GAVI has developed 
innovative financing instruments, it has also highlighted dilemmas that are 
common to other global vertical programmes. For example, the narrow focus of 
its objectives and preferences for distributing particular vaccines have potentially 
been at odds with ensuring partner country ownership, while coordination among 
stakeholders at the planning level has not necessarily translated into greater 
coordination among stakeholders at the country level (Radelet / Levine 2008).  
This last point indicates that a reliance on vertical programming also requires 
that donors work toward improving coordination internally. 
The UN-initiated Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria was 
designed as a vehicle for accelerating the global response to these three 
diseases.  The Fund is considered a financial institution and is dependent on 
other organisations to implement the programmes that it funds.  These 
programmes are selected in a demand-driven process of programming, centred 
on proposals emanating from so-called country coordinating mechanisms, which 
bring together a variety of stakeholders (development partners, business and 
civil society representatives, and governmental actors) to devise funding 
requests, which then pass through the Secretariat, a Technical Review Board, 
and the Fund’s Board prior to final approval.22
                                                 
21  See http://www.gavialliance.org for more information about the Alliance’s different financing 
instruments.  
 While the Fund prides itself on its 
demand-driven orientation and bureaucratic leanness, it also acknowledges that 
the procedures that it has established for obtaining funding need to be 
streamlined in order to achieve greater efficiency in implementation and 
22  This process is mapped out at: http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/structures/?lang=en.  
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suggests a need for better management of its relationships with partners and 
recipients alike (Global Fund 2009).  
 
While vertical programming is generally associated with global initiatives, the 
largest vertical programme that has recently been created rests within a bilateral 
aid system: the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 
the United States.  PEPFAR epitomizes the prospect for duplication with existing 
efforts that comes from the desire to spotlight a narrow set of issues within a 
vertical programme.  Not only does it have the same general goals as the Global 
Fund; it was also added to an already-fragmented US development assistance 
system featuring multiple agencies involved in implementing health programmes.  
The large scale of additional resources funnelled to the treatment, care, and 
prevention of HIV/AIDS has already had a demonstrated impact in the global 
fight against the disease. However, the large financial commitments the US 
government has made in this arena may end up placing pressure on other types 
of development spending in the future (Over 2008), offsetting benefits of the 
separate funding vehicle. Another issue confronting PEPFAR that it shares with 
other vertical programmes active in the sector is the need to contribute more to 
the strengthening of national health systems in order to allow for the long-term 
viability of its interventions (Oomman / Bernstein / Rosenzweig 2008).   
  
4.2. Looking toward the Future: Implications for Europe 
 
The potentially negative impact of vertical programming on capacity building in 
recipient countries is closely linked to the call for vertical programmes to be 
better integrated into both national development strategies and country-level 
programmes (World Bank 2008). Donors have a critical role to play in preventing 
the emergence of parallel systems of implementation at the country level.  This 
is especially due to their roles as stakeholders in the vertical programmes 
themselves.  As suggested above, the consistency of vertical programming with 
ongoing country programming requires the strengthening of communication 
between donors’ field offices and the parts of their bureaucracies that determine 
how to engage with global programmes.  In addition, achieving greater 
coordination with the newer funds must be considered an extension of ongoing 
but still incomplete efforts to improve coordination among traditional 
development partners. 
 
The pledges that have already been made to the largest global funds, especially 
in the health sector, ensure that these vehicles for providing assistance will 
maintain an important place in the global development landscape in the near 
term.  One open question is whether donors will choose to distribute even more 
funding through these programmes in order to focus attention on specific issues.  
There is ground for caution concerning further reliance on vertical programming. 
For one, this targeted funding may have the effect of creating a kind of path 
dependency in specific sectors, potentially limiting flexibility in donor and 
recipient programming in the long-term.  Another concern is that because of 
their bureaucratic leanness, donors may turn to vertical programming to avoid 
addressing internal problems of organisation and coordination within their 
development assistance programmes. In the short-term, this may allow for 
experimentation with innovative approaches for delivering development 
assistance outside of the confines of the existing system, however in the long-
term, the creation of additional vertical programmes may create new 
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bureaucratic burdens.  As a consequence, European donors should tread carefully 
in considering the value-added of new vertical programmes in the future.  
 
5. Conclusion: A Call for Transparency, Knowledge Transfer, and 
Coordinated Action within the European Development System 
 
This paper has provided an overview of the development activities of a variety of 
non-state actors that have risen in prominence in recent years.  The discussion 
has highlighted that there are still large information deficits about the scope of 
engagement of emerging non-state actors and about the nature of their impact 
on development outcomes.  While actors such as global programmes and the 
Gates Foundation have invested in evaluating the effectiveness of the 
programmes they fund and publish progress reports, information on the 
philanthropic activities of firms in developing countries remains especially 
limited.  European governments can contribute to increasing the transparency of 
the activities of these new donors by promoting improvements in financial 
reporting and monitoring and evaluation. The imperative for better monitoring of 
private aid efforts is especially strong where funding for development originates 
from entities that receive tax benefits from donor governments.  
 
The non-state actors profiled in this paper can potentially bring not only fresh 
resources but also fresh thinking on how to meet global development goals, for 
example through the promotion of new investment models and the expansion of 
market-oriented aid instruments. However, there is a danger that new entrants 
to the development field may not adequately internalize lessons learned from the 
decades of experiences that have accumulated within the traditional donor 
community. The diversification of the giving landscape presents a burden for 
longstanding aid donors to transfer their knowledge to rising actors about how 
assistance can be distributed in a more effective and equitable manner. Efforts to 
provide outreach to avoid repeating past mistakes can lead to the diffusion of 
standards of best practice which may have a broader impact on the behaviour of 
actors (especially firms) in developing countries. In the process of intensifying 
dialogue with emerging non-state actors, European donors themselves have the 
prospect to gain valuable know-how, which will be of special relevance in 
stimulating entrepreneurship and private sector development.  
 
Finally, the diversifying development landscape also provides an impulse for 
European donors to make progress in their own internal coordination efforts.  A 
better coordinated EU aid system can provide a valuable contact point for 
external actors and the EU level is an appropriate level for devising strategies on 
how to engage with and monitor the activities of new non-state actors, given 
that many of the most prominent emerging actors are either from outside of 
Europe or multinational in orientation. Moreover, criticisms of limited 
coordination with existing aid mechanisms that are levied against new actors 
have limited credence unless they are accompanied by real efforts on the part of 
European donors to reduce fragmentation and to harmonise development 
practice within their own aid systems.  
 
One element of increasing internal coordination on approaches to dealing with 
the non-state actors profiled in this paper is to strengthen mutual learning about 
the experiences that bilateral donors within the EU have collected to date in 
cooperating with foundations and private actors in particular.  In the Nordic 
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countries, for instance, there has been a long tradition of cooperation with the 
business community in the development policy arena, which has not only helped 
to sustain support for generous public aid programmes but has also stimulated 
interest among private actors in increasing their engagement in developing 
countries in a manner that moves beyond simple export promotion schemes. The 
example underlines that heightened engagement with non-state actors is of 
value not only in mobilising additional resources for development but also in 
shaping how these actors will engage with the rest of the world in the future.  
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EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION TO 2020
Over the next decade, Europe’s development policies will have to act on a combination 
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loom large in national debates. A key questions is: How will the EU, how will “Brussels” 
and the member states be working together on common problems? Global challenges 
include three issues increasingly facing EU’s development policy agenda:
• The emergence of new substantial actors in international development,
• The linkage between energy security, democracy and development and
• The impact of climate change on development.
Public and policy-making debates need to be informed about future options and their 
likely effects; and decisions need to be based on good research and sound evidence. 
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